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Abstract. This paper examines the mechanisms by which a World Champion is chosen in the For-
mula One Championship. Furthermore it is analysed whether there is a best method to do this. For 
this purpose we will discuss the methods used by the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile 
(FIA) since the founding of the World Championship in 1950. We show how the election of a 
method affects the Formula One contest. We then give insight whether there is a best method to se-
lect a World Champion or not. We therefore discuss Arrow’s Impossible Theorem with respect to 
this sports contest. Moreover we simulated several seasons and compared different scoring vectors 
with respect to indicators that might be important for viewer’s demand. 
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1 Introduction 
The Formula One World Championship is a car race series with a long tradition. It started in 1950 
and became one of the biggest sports events worldwide. During the last sixty years there were sev-
eral rule changes regarding the organization of the competition between drivers and teams and with 
respect to the determination of the world champion. In the beginning of 2009 the Fédération Inter-
nationale de l´Automobile (FIA), which organizes the Championship, intended to change, among 
other things, the rules for choosing the Formula One World Champion.3 This was not the first time 
the FIA modified the rules. Since 1950, there were actually four major changes. However the nega-
tive reaction to the suggested rule change was quite intense. The intention of the FIA was to modify 
the selection of the world champion via a scoring function and to install a rule where only the num-
bers of victories are decisive. The announcement of this concept started a public debate after some 
newspapers noted the fact that several of the past world championships would have had different 
outcomes if the new rules would had been employed.4 The following protests were successful and 
the FIA first postponed the introduction of the new rules to 2010 and then skipped the plan alto-
gether. Instead the FIA introduced a modification of the traditional scoring vectors. 
However there are several questions that need to be answered: Why had the protest been so intense? 
How much would the rule change have mattered? The central question, though, is: Is there a best 
way to determine a world champion and if there is how does it look like? 
There are several studies that did research on the topic Formula One. Kipker (2002) and Krauskopf, 
Langen  and  Bünger  (2010)  did  research  in  television  viewer’s  demand  and  Mastromarco  and 
Runkel (2004) examined the relationship of rule changes and competitive balance. Furthermore 
Stadelmann and Eichenberger (2008) wanted to find the best driver of all time. But as far as we 
know there are no studies examining different ways of the world champion determination. 
To analyse these question we examine in section 2 different scoring vectors and within a simple 
model we show in how many cases different scoring vectors would nevertheless produce the same 
world champion. To analyse whether there is a best way to determine the best driver we examine in 
section 3 the Arrow Theorem and apply it to the Formula One competition. We show that with 
some simple assumptions the only possible method in this sport contest is to select the world cham-
pion via a scoring function. In section 4 we analyse some aspects besides deciding the world cham-
pionship that might have relevance for choosing an appropriate scoring vector. We analyse the rule 
                                                           
3 Further changes dealt with budget limits and technical limitations. 
4 Of course it is too simple to review a rule change by comparing what this rule would have done in the past without an-
ticipating a behavioural change of the actors. This is common economic knowledge since Robert Lucas (1976).   3 
change of 2010 and give some insight on how a best scoring vector could look like. The fifth sec-
tion concludes. 
 
2 Scoring vectors of the Formula One 
A scoring function assigns for every alternative, depending on the place in a single ranking, a spe-
cific number of points and is aggregating several rankings to one final ranking by ordering via the 
total points of each alternative. This basic scheme can be modified in many ways. In the history of 
the Formula One World Championship six different scoring functions or more precisely scoring 
vectors were used.5   
Table 1 shows all the vectors that were used, labeled with the year they were established. With the 
proposed but now rejected rules everything would have stayed the same except for the determ ina-
tion of the first place in the final ranking. For this purpose only the first places in each race would 
have been taken into account. This can be interpreted in terms of social choice as a simple plurality 
vote (Gaertner 2006) and the vector would look  like a2010fia.6 It is important to notice that the 
suggested vector should only determine the world champion. All the other places in the final rank-
ing would have been determined by a2003. One reason for this could have been that a simple plu-
rality vote in some cases does not result in a complete transitive order. This paradox was first d e-
scribed by Condorcet (1785) and occurred in the Formula One in 2002 (Soares et al. (2005)). 
 
Table 1: Scoring vectors in the Formula One 
Scoring vector  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th 
a1950  8  6  4  3  2  0  0  0  0  0 
a1960  8  6  4  3  2  1  0  0  0  0 
a1961  9  6  4  3  2  1  0  0  0  0 
a1991  10  6  4  3  2  1  0  0  0  0 
a2003  10  8  6  5  4  3  2  1  0  0 
a2010  25  18  15  12  10  8  6  4  2  1 
a2010fia  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
a2010fota  12  9  7  5  4  3  2  1  0  0 
 
It is interesting, especially when changing from one scoring vector to another, in how many cases 
different scoring vectors deliver different aggregations. It is trivial that different scoring vectors can 
lead to different rankings, except if they are monotone transformations of each other. Saari (1984) 
has shown how many different rankings can be generated out of the same profile by using different 
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scoring functions. Some further remarks on this topic in the Formula One came from Kladroba 
(2000). In the following we are examining only in how many cases different scoring vectors are 
leading to the same world champions applied to the same season outcome. 
For a small number of different outcomes this is quite easy and the simpler problems can be solved 
by using pen and paper. But in the case of the Formula One the numbers are far too big. With m 
drivers and n races in the season there are (m!)
n possible different outcomes. By only examining the 





. Taking the values 
of the 2009 season with m=20, n=17 and p=8 we get approximately 
164 10 * 96 , 9  different possible 
outcomes and this is far too great to calculate. 
To measure the differences between two scoring vectors we therefore tested them with random 
samples. First we created a random outcome of one race and by doing this n times, we got a random 
season. Then we used the two scoring vectors we wanted to compare to determine the world cham-
pion for that simulated season. We simulated 1000 seasons determining the fraction of concordant 
world champions and repeated this 1000 times. We implicitly assume that every season outcome 
has the same possibility, i.e. all drivers are equally strong. We did this to give insight in all theoreti-
cal possible outcomes, not to give a realistic model. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the comparison of a2003 and a2010fia 
Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Observations 
0.529  0.529  0.584  0.476  0.016  -0.047  3.052  0.483  1000 
 
According to Table 2, which shows the descriptive statistics of the comparison between the vectors 
a2003 and a2010fia, the results are normally distributed. This is also confirmed by the significant 
low value of the Jacque-Bera test. The central limit theorem states that the mean of a sufficiently 
large number of independent random variables each with finite mean and variance will be approxi-
mately normally distributed. So our sample is sufficiently big enough and in Table 3 we are only 
reporting the means of our observations.  
 
Table 3: Comparison of the vectors used in the Formula 1 
  a1960  a1961  a1991  a2003  a2010  a2010fia 
a1950  0.926*  0.894  0.849  0.766  0.741  0.542 
a1960  1  0.928*  0.872  0.809  0.775  0.555 
a1961    1  0.941*  0.772  0.759  0.616 
a1991      1  0.7301*  0.731  0.661 
a2003        1  0.908*  0.529 
a2010          1  0.367 
a2010fia            1   5 
 
Comparing all the vectors ever used in the Formula One there are several interesting properties. 
First of all, the values marked with an asterisk in Table 3 are the ones where a switch in the Formu-
la One rules actually occurred. It is obvious that the rules suggested for 2010 would mark the big-
gest change in the history of the Formula One. Only in 52.9% the vector a2003 and a2010fia deliver 
the same world champion. The second biggest change in the history was in 2003 with 73% accord-
ance to the previous year’s vector. The vector actually introduced in the beginning of 2010 has ac-
cordance with the previous vector of 90.8%. The changes before 2003 were not only small in the 
degree of the vector change but also in the effects these changes have onto the world champion de-
cision. 
 












As the numbers of drivers or races per season differ from time to time we tested the differences of 
the a2003 and a2010fia for alternative numbers of drivers and races. We can see in Figure 1 that for 
two drivers the vectors do not differ at all, which is not surprising considering that ties are decided 
with the respective other vector. After this the compliance steadily declines to a value of around 0.5 
and with more than 11 drivers does not seem to alter anymore. 
The picture is slightly different for alternative numbers of races. For one race the value is of course 
1, has a second peak at 4 and after this is constantly going down. Taking a Formula One season 
with more than four races for granted we can say that more races mean more different results with 
these two vectors. 
Looking at the discussion of introducing a new point system at the beginning of the 2009 season it 
was common sense to strengthen the importance of the first place. The FOTA suggested a vector 
with a raise of 2 points for the first place. This is not as radical as making only victories count but 6  LANGEN, KRAUSKOPF: The Election of a World Champion 
raises the question of how many additional points for the first place in the a2003 are necessary to 
obtain the same result as the a2010fia.  
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 We compared the a2010fia and a2003 and gave additional points for the first place in the a2003. In 
Figure 2 we can of course see an increase which converts to 1, which means total conformity. It 
reaches total conformity with 30 additional points for the first place, hence 40 points in total. How-
ever also with 10 points, only twice as much as in a2003 amount, we get conformity of around 85%. 
The discussion of 2009 seems less dramatic from this perspective. 
 
 
3 Some Background from Social Choice Theory 
After showing the differences the vectors of the Formula One have made in the election of a world 
champion we now try to identify a best method. Since there are several parallels between the deter-
mination of a winner in a Formula One season and the aggregation of preferences, social choice 
theory may provide some insights.7 Aggregating the outcomes of all races into the determination of 
a world champion is similar to the aggregation of different preferences into the choice of a collec-
tive action.  
Arrow (1951) mentioned four preferable conditions an aggregation function should comply with 
and he furthermore showed that no aggregation rule could simultaneously meet all four require-
ments. The four conditions are the unrestricted domain condition, the weak Pareto principle, the in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship. The unrestricted domain condition re-
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quests that no individual preference ordering should be excluded a priori. If all individuals prefer 
one alternative with respect to another, the weak Pareto principle implies that this preference should 
also hold for the aggregated preference. The independence of irrelevant alternatives declares that 
the  comparison  of  two  alternatives  should  only  depend  on  these  two  alternatives.  The  non-
dictatorship condition demands that no individual should be able to determine the result of the pref-
erence ordering no matter how the other individual’s preferences look like. 
These conditions are to be applied to a Formula One season. To have a “fair” championship there 
should not be the possibility of excluding any theoretical possible outcome of the championship a 
priori. This is certainly true for the championship. If the non-dictatorship condition was violated 
there would be one, and only one, race that determines the season’s ranking making all other races 
irrelevant. This can not be in the interest of the FIA so this condition should not be violated. In fact 
an even stronger version of non-dictatorship holds, called anonymity (Gaertner 2006). Anonymity 
means, that all races in the season are equally important for the final ranking. It is easy to see that 
also the weak Pareto principle should be satisfied. As there are only strict preferences in each race 
with the weak Pareto principle, a driver who is always better than another driver should also be bet-
ter in the final ranking.8 In combination with the other conditions the weak Pareto principle leads to 
neutrality. This means that by changing the positions of any two drivers in every race the same 
change will occur in the championship ranking. At first sight it should be clear that if these condi-
tions are not met an aggregation rule would neglect fundamental intuitions about fairness in a sports 
contest. As shown by Arrow no rule can satisfy all conditions mentioned above. Therefore, all fea-
sible aggregation rules employed by the Formula One will violate the independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives. The comparison of two drivers in the final ranking will depend on the performance of the 
other drivers.  
Apart from the conditions mentioned by Arrow, an aggregation rule in sport competition should al-
so satisfy the condition of consistency. That means that drivers who are in the best set of every sub-
set of the season, should also be in the best set of the whole season. Considering these fundamental 
rules, Young (1975) stated the characteristics of the aggregation rule: “A social choice function is 
anonymous, neutral and consistent if and only if it is a scoring function”. If it is not possible to sat-
isfy all preferable conditions, a more or less pronounced balance between these conditions should 
be found. By declaring some conditions to be more important than others, the only stable solution to 
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aggregate the results of the races is a scoring function. And as we have seen, since the founding of 
the Formula One championship, this has been exactly the way the FIA aggregated the results.  
 
4 Is there a best scoring vector? 
The Arrow Theorem shows that the only adequate method is to aggregate the results via a scoring 
function. This leaves the question for the appropriate scoring vector. There are endless different 
possibilities how a scoring vector can be constructed. Some remarks for scoring vectors in sports 
contests came from Petigk (1990). In the Formula One six different scoring vectors were used. To 
answer the question whether there is a best scoring vector we first need an aim the scoring vector 
should be best in. The first but not the only goal is of course the selection of the season’s best driv-
er. But even the definition of the best driver depends highly on normative considerations. Is a con-
stant driver better than a driver with a higher variance in places but more top results? Furthermore 
the selection of the best driver might be the most important but not the only objective the scoring 
vector should accomplish. The FIA, as the organizer of the world championship, could have a lot of 
alternative aims. We assume that the FIA is an organisation with the goal of profit maximisation. In 
the end the revenues the FIA can generate are highly depending on spectators’ interest. Spectators´ 
interest is generating direct revenues and indirect via commercial revenues. So we think the objec-
tive goal of the FIA is the maximisation of spectators’ interest. A lot of the variables which are used 
to describe spectators’ interest are based on the concepts of fairness and suspense or uncertainty of 
outcome (e.g. Simmons (2009)). 
In the following we again simulate Formula One seasons and adopt different vectors to generate 
rankings. We then compare the results of these aggregations and show how the scoring vectors af-
fect variables that are important for the viewer’s demand. In contrast to the simulation in section 2 
we now used different winning probabilities for the drivers. We assign for the drivers, who can also 
be interpreted as combinations of drivers and cars, units of talent. The talent units of one driver di-
vided by the sum of all drivers’ talent units is his winning probability. The complete assignment of 
talent units is a talent distribution. We used six different talent distributions to compare the vectors 
and the particular talent units per driver can be seen, along with the Gini coefficient of these distri-





   9 
Table 4: Talent distributions 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  Gini 
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0 
2  4  3  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.204 
  3  20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0.317 
4  10  6  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.397 
5  10  9  9  8  8  7  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.499 
6  1024  512  256  128  64  32  16  8  4  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.844 
 
In the first distribution every driver has one unit of talent which means that the possibility of every 
place is the same for every driver. In the second distribution driver 1 has four units of talent, driver 
2 three units and so on. In the third distribution talent is constantly decreasing. The forth distribu-
tion is a more extreme version of the second distribution. In the fifth distribution we modelled three 
teams that are stronger than the rest and with a slight inequality in drivers’ talent. In the sixth distri-
bution, beginning with the tenth best driver, the drivers have the double amount of talent units com-
pared to the next best driver.  
A race simulation, for example with the second distribution, is calculated in the following way. We 
begin with the total talent population.9 From this population a driver is chosen randomly, represent-
ed by one number. This is the winner of the first race. After this we removed all the other talent 
units of this driver in case there are any left. Then we are repeating this for all places until we have 
a whole race outcome. By repeating this n times we get a season existing of n races. For every value 
we present in the following, 1000 seasons were simulated 
Next we have to choose variables that are proxies for viewer’s attention. We assume that the longer 
a world championship is undecided the more suspense it has. Another cause for suspense might be 
the total amount of different champions over a number of seasons. For some viewers it could be 
important that the best driver becomes champion. The competitive balance or uncertainty of out-
come is frequently used in the sport economics to describe viewer’s attention (e.g. Quirk and Ford 
(1992)). Usually competitive balance is measured with the Gini coefficient. We compared different 
scoring vectors according to how they transform the unequal distributed talent into a point distribu-
tion at the end of the season. Our last variable is the number of cases, where the vector is not able to 
decide the world championship because of ties.  
In Figure 3 we can see the average number of races after which the season is decided. For the most 
talent distributions (except the 6th distribution) the vectors which were actually used in the Formula 
One do not differ to a great extent. The a2010fia compared to the actually used vector delivers for 
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some distributions longer and for some other shorter seasons. It is noticeable that the Borda10 vec-
tor is generating the highest number of undecided races for all distributions. 
 






















































Figure 4 shows the number of different world champions the scoring vectors generate. For most of 
the cases the choice of a scoring vector does not matter as the number of different world champions 
does not change. Exceptions are the talent distributions 2 and 3 and the vector a2010fia. With both 
distributions the a2010 delivers more different world champions than the a2003 but less than the 
a2010fia. 
 


























































                                                           
10  The vector is named after the French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda. The vector assigns one point for the last 
place and for every better place always one point more.    11 











































































As mentioned above the definition of the best driver highly depends on normative considerations. In 
our simulations we therefore tested the possibility of the most talented driver becoming world 
champion. As we can see in Figure 5 nearly all scoring vectors deliver similar results. So in most 
cases the vectors are not determining the probability for the best driver becoming world champion. 
The one exception is the vector a2010fia. For all cases where there actually is a most talented driver 
the appliance of the vector a2010fia leads to a lower probability for the best driver becoming world 
champion.  
In figure 6 the Gini coefficients of the different talent distributions were plotted against the Gini co-
efficients of the point distribution in the final ranking. The graphs show how the vectors transform 
the inequality of talent into an unequal point distribution. On the 45° line the inequality of these two 
distributions is the same. We see that the highest inequality of scored points for every talent distri-
bution, even with equally distributed talent, was produced by the a2010fia. The Borda scoring vec-
tors has for every talent distribution the lowest corresponding Gini coefficient in point distribution. 
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Every vector produces an unequal point distribution and the level of inequality depends, among 
other things, on the number of ranks the scoring vector is assigning point to. For this reason vector 
a2010fia, with only one point rank, always produces the highest inequality. The vectors which were 
used between 1960 and 2003 do not differ in the number of point ranks and produce nearly the 
same relation between the two Ginis. With the a2003, a2010 and the Borda vector the equality in 
the point distribution is rising with the number of point ranks. 
Table 5 provides the fraction of 1000 simulated seasons a vector was not able to determine a world 
champion because ties occurred. The a2010fia has always got the highest fraction whereas the Bor-
da has got the lowest in most of the cases. Comparing the a2003 and a2010 the latter is better in de-
ciding world championships. 
 
Table 5: Fraction of cases the vector is unable to decide the world championship 
  a1950  a1960  a1961  a1991  a2003  a2010  a2010fia  a2010fota  Borda 
1  0.082  0.071  0.085  0.074  0.061  0.028  0.485  0.056  0.034 
2  0.029  0.017  0.028  0.015  0.021  0.007  0.306  0.017  0.012 
3  0.055  0.054  0.043  0.037  0.038  0.021  0.363  0.032  0.023 
4  0.014  0.016  0.022  0.016  0.008  0.006  0.161  0.009  0.012 
5  0.032  0.046  0.047  0.036  0.044  0.019  0.304  0.029  0.049 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that the introduction of a majority vote in the election of a Formula 
One world championship would indeed have been the biggest change in the history of different 
scoring systems in the Formula One. We have shown with the Arrow Theorem that the only possi-
ble method to select a world champion in the Formula One is by aggregating the races via a scoring 
function. The questions whether there is a best scoring vector or not cannot be answered in general 
because it highly depends on normative considerations. We assumed that the FIA is a profit maxi-
mizer and therefore wants to maximise the viewer’s demand. Thus we compared different scoring 
vectors for different talent distributions according to variables that are considered to be important 
for viewer’s demand.  
The vector the FIA introduced in 2010 does not affect the average real season; the one suggested at 
first would have had a bigger impact for this variable. The new vector also does not change the 
probability of the most talented driver becoming world champion. But for most distributions the 
vector actually used in 2010 raises the number of different world champions. It also produces for all 
talent distributions a lower inequality in the point distribution. Altogether the introduction of the 
new vector seems to be a slight improvement in the variables we choose to analyse. 
In general we can say that vectors with a higher number of point ranks generate longer undecided 
seasons. This leaves less interesting races at the end of the season. These vectors also generate low-
er inequality in the point distributions and thus a higher competitive balance. On the other hand 
fewer point ranks make the success of an underdog more realistic. Thus such vectors generate a 
higher number of different champions. To establish a best scoring vector more research on the spe-
cifics of viewer’s demand is needed. Future studies should also examine the suspense in the races or 
in other words the fight for better positions in a race and this effect on viewer’s demand. Our study 
shows that the decision for a longer or shorter point vector has positive as well as negative effects 
on viewer’s demand. Therefore  empirical  studies of the importance of different  factors for the 
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